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ABSTRACT: The central question of Churchland’s book Braintrust1 is where do 
moral values come from? She answers it in terms of the latest research in neu-
roscience, evolutionary biology, experimental psychology, and genetics. By ex-
plaining and understanding our social practices via scientific research Churchland 
tries to provide a neurobiological platform for morality and thus illuminates the 
usually neglected account that moral properties are in some sense natural proper-
ties. She puts the results of the latest empirical experiments into the philosophical 
framework in such a way that it forms a foundation for our moral behaviour. The 
book is therefore about the biological approach to human morality. However, in 
what sense moral properties are (via social properties) natural (neurobiological) 
properties, as the naturalistic approach to the origins of human morality suggests, 
remains murky. To blame is presumably the presently limited powers of neuro-
biological explanations of social, and consequently, moral behaviour since the 
complex neural mechanisms of our brains are still not clear enough.
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Churchland’s motivation for the search of the origins of morality might 
be found in her introductory story from her childhood which ultimately 
taught her that in the Middle Ages the system of trial by ordeal worked 
well when a confession had to extraced from the guilty, or worse, when 
the innocent had to be protected: the former conceded their guilt in the 
belief that God would not help them whereas the latter did not fear trial by 
ordeal in the belief that God was on their side, which proved to be a fatal 
mistake when the women accused of witchcraft drowned in the river. The 
1 Patricia S. Churchland, Braintrust, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, 
273 pp.
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main question addressed by the author is therefore where do moral values 
come from? In order to answer it the author looks at the latest research 
on social behaviour in the fields of neuroscience, evolutionary biology, 
experimental psychology, and genetics and tries to put it into the philo-
sophical framework in such a way that it forms a foundation for our moral 
behaviour: “My aim here is to explain what is probably true about our 
social nature, and what that involves in terms of the neural platform for 
moral behaviour” (3).
She rejects so-called scientism, which might be understood as the use 
of science for the explanation of things that are none of science’s busi-
ness: to understand morality with the help of neurophysiological research 
concerning questions such as what makes people and other animals social 
beings does not mean to substitute humanities normally dealing with them 
but to overcome their vulnerability as shown, for example, in philosophi-
cal “speculations” on moral intuitions. Here scientific aspects of how so-
cial problems are solved, social navigation works and neurons perform 
evaluation are supposed to make the difference. Depending on the context, 
that is the social community, one behaviour will count as legitimate or 
moral and the other not.
The book understands ethics or morality as a combination of four so-
cial elements whereby underlying brain processes are responsible for their 
connectedness: (a) care (for relatives and friends originating in attach-
ment), (b) recognition of others’ mental states (originating in the benefit of 
predicting others’ behaviour), (c) solving problems in a social context (e.g. 
how to distribute rare goods etc.) and (d) learning social practices (by 
analogy, by mimicry, by conditioning, and so on). On these social values 
stand moral values, says Churchalnd, who puts her aim in this book some-
what differently: “… to understand what it is about the brains of highly 
social mammals that enables their sociability and thus to understand what 
grounds morality” (10).
The book is therefore about the biological approach to human mo-
rality. The author modestly points out that this strategy is not completely 
new: it can be found in Aristotle and later in Hume, A. Smith and Darwin. 
However, the rapid development of neuroscience, biology and social sci-
ences in recent years, which have illuminated connections between the 
brain and morality, has enabled a more precise elaboration. The central 
argument is developed through eight individual chapters: the first chapter 
is a brief introduction; the second chapter outlines limits of the research 
of social behaviour in the light of evolution; the third chapter offers a de-
tailed picture of the evolution of the human brain and care (for ourselves 
and for others) emphasizing the role of a hormone oxytocin; the fourth 
chapter examines human cooperation and trust; the fifth chapter carefully 
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states what is known about genes for morality; the sixth chapter points 
out the social importance of ascribing mental states to others; the seventh 
chapter analyses the essence of rules and their roles and the last chapter 
deals with the relation between religion and morality.
The second chapter, entitled “Brain-Based Values”, explicitly empha-
sizes that moral practices originate in social practices, that is, in attachment 
to relatives and friends. Within these social values, conflict between our 
needs and the needs of others results in problems that threaten our exist-
ence and must be solved immediately. Some solutions are better and some 
worse, some long-term and some short-term, but all lead to the emergence 
of a cultural practice. Within the cultural practice intuitions about what is 
right and what is wrong are formed and children adopt them in the process 
of growing up. The question the author poses is “how is it that brains care 
about anything?” (13).
Neurobiology does not have a finite answer to the question just yet. 
Nevertheless, it can be said with a great deal of certainty that the most 
primitive value, care for ourselves and our own well-being (self-care), is 
based on brain processes. Otherwise, we would not survive and therefore 
fail to complete our mission, i.e. passing on our genes. However, it is 
not that clear why we care for others, that is, why there are social val-
ues. Churchland thinks that they too increase our chances of survival as 
being simply energetically wasteful and dangerous they would not have 
evolved. It is probably the case that the price we pay when taking care of 
others is lower than the reproductive profit we get. Neuroendocrinologi-
cal evidence indicates that at some point the organization of our nervous 
system changed in such a way that we started to take care of others, first 
of those to whom we are closest (offspring, relatives, friends), and then 
even strangers. The author says that from this extent of care, which marks 
social behaviour and for which, at least according to our present data, an 
ancient peptide oxytocitin (a chain of aminoacids) is responsible, morality 
has emerged.
She points out that two other evolutionary changes in the evolution 
of the brain have also contributed to the rise of morality: the first was the 
occurrence of negative feelings (fear) in the case of separation from off-
spring or threat of danger, and the occurrence of positive feelings (pleas-
ure) in the case of being reunited or when the danger has passed, and the 
second was an increased capacity to learn sponsored by an improvement 
in our memory which enabled prediction of problems and more effective 
planning of behaviour. The idea is that “attachment, underwritten by the 
painfulness of separation and the pleasure of company, and managed by 
intricate neural circuitry and neurochemicals, is the neural platform for 
morality” (16). Churchland adds that we do not speak of a new gene re-
286 Prolegomena 11 (2) 2012
sponsible for the realization of new social behaviour, e.g. other-care, but 
merely of a modification of the existent gene material. It is true that with 
time new genes emerge but they do not produce changes in social cogni-
tion or social temperament, they affect smaller changes linked to how or-
ganisms work, such as the ability of an adult human to digest animal milk. 
However, at the present time there is no compelling evidence for the claim 
that changes in social behaviour require new genes.
The third chapter, entitled “Caring and Caring for”, brings an insight 
into the neurochemistry of attachment and bonding (call it AB) of mam-
mals – humans, in which morality is supposed to be rooted. The first and 
most elementary component of AB is self-preservation/self-caring. De-
spite their complexity, as yet not entirely understood, it is beyond doubt 
that it is the underlying neural mechanisms that are leading to it: the ex-
perience of fear, which is supposed to keep us alive, and the appropriate 
behaviour securing it are the result of adjusted actions of the hypothala-
mus, subcortical, insular and cingulate cortex. “Integrating signals from 
both the inner milieu and the body surface, the brainstem-limbic circuitry 
is the foundational organization serving self-preservation, and therewith a 
minimal sense of self” (30).
The second part of AB is other-caring, which can be explained, as 
mentioned before, by the increase in our chances of survival and gene 
preservation. Our homeostasis depends in the first place on the well-being 
of our closest relatives followed by friends, colleagues and even com-
plete strangers. A crucial stage in the extent of care to others has been 
the so-called mammalian female brain maternalization brought about by 
the changing roles of peptide ocytocine, arginine vasopressin and other 
hormones. Mammals equipped in such a manner had better chances of 
survival compared to mammals in which the role of the mentioned hor-
mones remained unchanged, e.g. to motivate females to feed, cultivate 
and defend their offspring. Brain maternalization occurs during pregnancy 
when the placenta makes arrangements that the hormones progestin, es-
trogen, and prolactin that affect the neurons in the subcortical part of the 
brain come into blood. Oxytocin is responsible for the contraction of the 
fetus at birth, the expressing of milk during lactation, and the suckling 
of the new-born child. Pain is also important for the emergence of mam-
malian social behaviour. An organism understands it as a signal to protect 
itself. Through modification of the underlying neural mechanisms, evolu-
tion has extended the necessity to protect to others. It is not by chance that 
oxytocin and vasopressin are responsible for the described extent of care; 
in their earlier versions they were involved in reproduction processes even 
before mammals appeared.
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The third part of AB also used for a survival and well-being is predic-
tion. With its help mammals avoid predators as well as social conflicts. It 
is very useful for humans to estimate how things will develop in a certain 
situation and take all necessary precautions. This is nicely illustrated by 
human relations in which predicting the mental states of others that could 
be brought about by our behaviour or actions is desirable. Since we feel 
safe in a domestic and known environment that reduces fear and pain and 
which enables us to, as Churchland says, “rest and digest”, it is vital for 
us to judge correctly how our behaviour affects those that are close to us. 
The author states once again that evolution does not create a new brain 
mechanism in order to adapt an organism to new needs but changes the 
existing one step by step. “Social emotions, values, and behaviour are not 
the result of a wholly new engineering plan, but rather, an adaption of 
existing arrangements and mechanisms that are intimately linked with the 
self-preserving circuitry for fighting, freezing, and flight, on the one hand, 
and for rest and digest, on the other” (46).
The fourth part of AB that evidently shows that some mammals have 
extended attachment also to individuals beyond the narrow family circle 
is mate attachment. This is not something exclusive to humans: 3% of 
other mammals also commit to long-lasting partnership. It is a very so-
phisticated form of social behaviour governed once again by oxytocin and 
vasopressin extracted from the hypothalamus and travelling to those sub-
cortical parts of our brains that regulate reward, sexual behaviour and par-
enthood. In addition, the neurotransmitter dopamin is also important in the 
expression of social behaviour, playing a crucial role in neuron changes in 
the system of reward and punishment and prediction of others’ behaviour, 
both crucial to how animals learn about the world. However, Churchland’s 
belief that social and moral behaviour are in fact actions of the same kind 
is to a certain extent supported by neurophysiological evidence showing 
that in both cases, when individuals see a certain action as moral and when 
they see it merely as social, the same area of prefrontal cortex is active.
The fourth chapter, entitled “Cooperating and Trusting”, considers a 
neurobiological basis for the extent of cooperation and trust that is mor-
ally relevant for social behaviour toward friends and strangers. So far, 
Churchland has discovered that the extent of care, from children to com-
plete strangers, which is essential for humans as social beings, is a result 
of neuron connections in which oxytocin plays a crucial role, even though 
a clear and final picture of the exact processes at play is still out of reach. 
The question is whether cooperation depends on the same hormone (pep-
tide), i.e. oxytocine, as well. First, she tries to find a definition that would 
cover all actions described as cooperation, and finally ends up with the 
one mentioned in the Oxford English Dictionary: “The action of co-oper-
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ating, i.e. of working together towards the same end, purpose, or effect; 
joint operation” (68).
If the central hypothesis of the book holds, i.e., that morality origi-
nates in the neurobiology of attachment, which is supported by the modifi-
cation of oxytocin and vasopressin that causes the extent of care to others, 
cooperation and trust should be sensitive to different levels of oxytocine 
as well. The results of various neurophysiological tests (the “Trust” game, 
the “Dictator” and the “Ultimatum” game, or the “Reading the Mind with 
the Eyes” test) show that this is true. In all the mentioned tests, subjects 
with a higher level of oxytocin showed better results: they were more 
trusting, more sensitive to the feelings of others, and better at predicting 
their mental states. It is interesting, however, that, the last test at least, the 
“Reading the Mind with the Eyes”, shows a difference between men and 
women. Do not think, Churchland says, that it would be useful to spray 
oxytocin around in order to decrease social tensions since its negative 
implications in the case of long-term use are still unclear (besides, “to be 
trustful all the time” is clearly not an appropriate survival strategy). In ad-
dition, it is also too soon to use it for therapeutic purposes. It is true that 
patients with autism spectrum disorder, after being treated with oxytocin 
showed better results with respect to social behaviour but this still has to 
be further documented.
However, cooperation and trust are not affected only by a higher level 
of oxytocin. Experiments show that pain, reputation, punishment, and a 
group’s social structure also play an important role. When punishment 
was allowed in games cooperation increased; likewise players were pre-
pared to cooperate more with persons known to be trustworthy. As shown 
by research between bonobos (formerly called pygmy chimpanzees) and 
regular chimpanzees, a social system with less fighting, competition, ag-
gression, and rivalry also contributes to the growth of cooperation. Bono-
bos were ready to cooperate more than chimpanzees, allegedly because of 
their food richer habitat, which has enabled them to evolve a more tolerant 
character. Despite everyday social catastrophes people seem to be closer 
to the former than to the latter, and we are tolerant to others who are dif-
ferent and often even enjoy their company.
The fifth chapter, entitled “Networking: Genes, Brains, and Behav-
iour”, answers the question of how genes affect our social behaviour. The 
impressive level of human cooperation suggests that this ability is “in 
our nature”, which raises speculation as to a special gene for coopera-
tion. Since much social behaviour can be explained also as non-biologi-
cal or non-evolutional, Churchland emphasizes that we have to be careful 
in stipulating causal links between cooperation and a genetic base. She 
suggests that cooperation is like aggression, a result of attachment and 
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care which makes the existence of a special gene for cooperation highly 
questionable. What are the conditions that have to be met in order for X 
to be the gene for Y? “If gene X has a strong, specific association with a 
behavioral trait or psychiatric disease in all known environments and the 
physiological pathway from X to Y is short or well-understood, then it 
may be appropriate to speak of X as a gene for Y” (97).
The non-existence of genes for social behaviours is also supported 
by the latest research. The problem is that according to the current re-
sults relations between genes and behaviour are not one-to-one but one-
to-many. Pleiotropy, as it is known, means that one gene performs many 
different tasks, and this is not an exception but rather a rule. This is nicely 
illustrated by serotonin which is, among others, involved in respiration, 
appetite, aggression, pain-sensitiveness and sexual behaviour. If, for ex-
ample, serotonin were the gene for aggression its level in aggressive fruit 
flies should be higher than in normal fruit flies. Results have shown that 
with respect to serotonin there was no difference. However, the aggressive 
fruit flies differed from normal fruit flies in 80 genes (but not in serotonin) 
among which are many involved in a bunch of phenotype changes; in this 
case they somehow in combination produced the aggressive behavior in 
fruit flies. The idea, Churchland says, is not simply that things are com-
plicated but that one gene has many different jobs and that interactions 
among them are non-linear. It is unlikely that there is a causal connection 
between social behaviour, such as aggression or cooperation, and one or 
some genes because changes in gene expression can be a result of the 
gene’s interaction with its environment.
In the light of this, psychologist Marc Hauser’s presumption that there 
are universal moral principles which are innate, that is based on a simi-
lar general strategy that we apply when solving similar social problems, 
e.g. cunningness at hunting or readiness to consolation, is controversial. 
He says that the universality of moral intuitions, for example that incest 
is wrong, is strong evidence for the claim that they are innate and pro-
duced by their neurophysiological foundation, some kind of moral organ. 
Churchland, her semantic difficulties with “innate” and “universal” aside, 
rejects the idea with the fact that moral behaviour seems to be a conse-
quence of explicit religious or governmental requests rather than a result 
of the so called moral organ. Moreover, we know how to make boats, we 
recognize types of cars, we eat with our hands etc., but do not have a spe-
cial gene for making boats, recognizing types of cars or eating with hands, 
respectively. Her idea is simple: to tell the truth, which is undoubtedly an 
universal moral value, is compatible with the existence of the innate organ 
but it does not imply it. “Without a doubt, genes have a huge role to play in 
what we are, but exactly what the role is remains to be clarified” (109).
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The sixth chapter, entitled “Skills for a Social Life”, deals with the 
neurobiology of how we understand our own mind and that of others. 
Neuroscientists assume that intelligence in human social behaviour is due 
to the prefrontal cortex of our brain and that its size is supposed to be pro-
portional to its ability to predict social behaviour. It is labeled “the organ 
of civilization”; unfortunately, however, the neural mechanisms that pro-
duce the array of its physical and social functions are not yet clear enough. 
It is known, though, that in interactions with other parts of the brain it 
affects emotions, feelings, sensations and drives. Churchland admits that 
she cannot give an explanation of brain mechanisms of social actions on 
a micro level but can, nevertheless, explain them on a macro level. The 
problem is that the same activity of a neuron of the prefrontal cortex can 
be explained in different ways, i.e. it can be linked with sensations, atten-
tion, emotions, prediction, and so on, or even with a combination of these 
mental states.
The method currently used to establish how the prefrontal cortex 
works is functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). How does fMRI 
work? Details aside, by the help of a difference between the magnetic 
properties of the blood carrying oxygen and that whose oxygen has been 
taken up by cells (the blood-oxygen-level-dependent contrast – BOLD) 
when performing some task we infer that the part of the brain properly 
coloured on the monitor is active. Despite its exceptionality fMRI has 
limitations that have to be taken into consideration: the mentioned differ-
ences between the bloods can be extremely small, so it is nearly impos-
sible to conclude solely by the colouration on the screen which part of the 
prefrontal cortex is active and which is not; it measures only the average 
activity of all neurons (100.000) in one cubic milimeter of brain tissue, 
rendering it impossible to see which operations neurons of the active part 
of the brain have carried out, or which neuron connections are so long that 
they exceed the coloured area of the prefrontal cortex.
However, social knowledge in terms of social prediction is crucial 
for survival and prosperity, that is for well-being and reproduction. One 
important way to learn social skills is imitation, together with other forms 
of learning via the reward-punishment system, in which a theft is followed 
by an unpleasant punishment whereas honesty is followed by a pleasant 
reward – mimicry provides a child with conscience. Predicting the behav-
iour of others is useful because it enables us to avoid problems that might 
be caused by our actions, and it is more effective when explained in terms 
of internal intentions and feelings than merely in terms of certain move-
ments with typical consequences that turn out to be deceptive (thumbs up, 
for example, carries a range of meanings). The question is whether the so 
291J. BREGANT: In Brain We Trust
called mirror neurons provide a neurophysiological basis for understand-
ing and ascribing mental states to others.
Mirror neurons have been discovered in G. Rizzolatti’s lab in rhesus 
monkeys; they are a subset of neurons of the prefrontal cortex that are ac-
tive in both cases, when a monkey sees another monkey grasping an object 
and putting it into her mouth and when she herself does the same thing. 
Moreover, there is a small difference between grasping-to-get and grasp-
ing-to-eat, i.e. in the first case other neurons are active as in the second 
case, from which neuroscientists have inferred that these neurons code for 
action understanding, that is, these neurons represented a goal or inten-
tion. The idea that mirror neurons could code for intentions developed 
in 1998 into the so called simulation theory, which says that my neurons 
simulate your movement (for example, grasping for food), and if there is 
a match of neuron activities when simulating and when really doing the 
movement (grasping for food) I know what your intention is (from when 
I do the movement I intend to eat I infer that so do you). Later the view 
has been further elaborated, but Churchland rejects it, claiming that my 
simulation of your doing does not imply that I know what your intention 
is, e.g. from you raising a hand I cannot infer what you intend to do: you 
might say hello to someone, you might be stretching your hand, you might 
be voting, you might want to ask a question, and so on.
Another similar account that also rests on mirror neurons when as-
cribing mental states to others claims that a simulation of emphatic reac-
tions represents a better way of determining the intentions of others than, 
simply said, the simulation of their movements. The point is that the imita-
tion of mental states of others works via the nervous system of our brain, 
that is, a simulation of your sad face in my brain makes me sad, which 
implies knowledge of your feelings on my part. Churchland has doubts 
about this project since neurophysiological results have shown that the 
activation of the same neurons in observed and felt sensation is not neces-
sarily the same. When they see the same facial expression different people 
can feel entirely different things: when she sees someone who is angry the 
observer can really feel anger, but also shame or even joy, which means 
that we recognize an angry person by another means than the simulation 
of emphatic reactions. These problems, which concern every simulation 
theory are not new; sadly, the introduction of mirror neurons does not 
solve them.
The last but far from complete account for ascribing intentions, which 
Churchland seems to be in favour of, states that empathy is extended to 
relatives and then friends and strangers by analogy with care, for which no 
simulation mechanism is needed, as the changed role of hormones in our 
neural network will do.
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The seventh chapter, entitled “Not as a Rule”, evaluates the role of 
rules and norms in morality. Among moral philosophers there is a prevail-
ing opinion, Churchland says, that morality is a set of rules guiding our 
actions. Perhaps the most prominent within this group is John Rawls, who 
has tried to formulate universal rules of fairness that were supposed to be 
a moral foundation and that could act as a guide to what is right and wrong 
in any situation. She does not agree with such an approach and introduces 
reasons that reject the idea of rules and their rational use as being the core 
of morality.
However, the first rule that is supposed to be exceptionless and thus, 
with regard to morality, universally applicable is the so called Golden 
Rule rooted in the Bible (Mathew 7:12) which says “Do unto others as 
you would have them do unto you”. Unfortunately, the Golden Rule can-
not serve as the first principle and the moral guide in all circumstances be-
cause it allows exceptions: in war, I want to kill my enemy but do not want 
that he kills me; in medicine, I want someone to donate a kidney to me if I 
need one, but it does not mean that being healthy I have to donate mine to 
someone who needs one; in business, I fire an incompetent employee but I 
do not want that this happens to me, and so on. The classic mistake in the 
Golden Rule can be, moreover, described as follows: sometimes you want 
to do to me what you really want that I would do to you, even though I do 
not want that you do that to me at all. Obviously, the Golden Rule does 
not always hold and moral judgments for which it is used also depend on 
something else, that is, context.
A known proponent of the exceptionless rule for moral behaviour 
was Kant and his categorical imperative. It served as a filter to determine 
which universal rules would be adopted by all members of society without 
contradiction – in his opinion those that would contribute to my own well-
being – and it was those rules that have then miraculously become moral 
rules. That the idea about a consistent universal rules is false can be shown 
by conceiving an universal rule, which is clearly immoral, but would be 
accepted by all persons without being irrational, e.g. “All patients with 
painful terminal cancer should be euthanised”. Besides, Kant’s basic idea, 
Churchland says, about eliminating sensations and feelings from the pro-
cess of determining what are our moral obligations seems to be, mildly 
put, strange.
The next defenders of the universal moral principle introduced in the 
book are Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Bentham is famous for 
his unconditional rule which says that one ought to act in order to produce 
the greatest happiness for the greatest number; today the rule is known as 
utilitarianism. Otherwise, consequentialism is the more general name for 
all accounts stating that it is consequences that morally matter. Mill differs 
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from Bentham in that the only thing that is desirable as an end is happines. 
For him some action is not right or wrong on the basis of how much hap-
piness it produces, i.e. on the basis of some maximization rule, but on the 
basis of being or not being harmful to others and whether or not it requires 
restrictions on personal liberty that are still acceptable. As a matter of fact, 
his theory warns us, Churchland says, that Bentham’s maximizing aggre-
gate happiness is problematic.
Peter Singer is one of the contemporary maximizing consequential-
ists who claims that when calculating consequences all persons should be 
treated equally, which means that the well-being of my children must not 
be put ahead of the well-being of an unknown stranger. Churchland does 
not agree with him: in her opinion he demands from us more than is needed 
to be moral. Consequentialism is useful, she says, if it refers to a set of 
exemplary moral prototypes, i.e. cases leading to good/right consequences 
– well-being, which are then by analogy extended to other cases where 
their individual constraints are taken into account. Sensitive people know 
what is the right thing to do without looking at rules. Her argument rests 
on an analogy between prudential (everyday) and moral cases. It seems to 
her that in our everyday life, in order to react correctly, we do not have to 
know any rules and our decisions depend on context or case: “Case-based 
reasoning involves drawing on a remembered prototype that resembles the 
case at hand, and filling in the similarity with a similar response” (182). 
And why would this not also hold for moral cases? If my neighbor is not 
at home and I see that the deer will eat up his young cherry trees, and I 
know that he does not want that, I will chase the deer away and fix a hole 
in a fence through which they have come in. In this case, Churchland says, 
I certainly did not act upon the universal rule “Always help neighbors”. 
The idea of always following unconditional general principles which help 
us to produce our moral behaviour is, therefore, weird.
In the final part of the chapter Churchland mentions a distinction 
between descriptive and normative on which a contemporary morality is 
based. The distinction states that what is – descriptive (facts) has nothing 
to do with what ought to be – normative (values); to the former belong, 
among others, social and neurophysiological facts and to the latter a ra-
tional or intellectual quest or endeavour. This is an important issue because 
the distinction makes her book, which defends the naturalistic approach 
to morality, irrelevant. Churchland argues that the distinction rests on a 
mistake known as the naturalistic fallacy. Its point has been expressed 
by G. E. Moore as follows: if a naturalistic property being happy were 
identical to a moral property being good then the meaning of ‘happiness’ 
and ‘good’ would be the same, that is, they would be synonymous. The 
problem is, according to Moore, that this would make the sentence “hap-
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piness is good” equivalent to the sentence “happiness is happiness” which 
is uninformative. Since the sentence “happiness is good” is, nevertheless, 
informative, there must be something seriously wrong with identifications 
of natural and moral properties defended by naturalism. His argument has 
merely reinforced the opinion of many philosophers that values are some-
thing completely different from facts, and that the latter cannot tell us any-
thing at all about the former. Nowadays moral philosophers interpret this 
in the following way: “because science cannot tell us anything about what 
is valuable it cannot tell us anything about how we ought to live”.
In Churchland’s opinion, Moore’s argument fails because it states that 
when we say A is B we mean that A and B are synonyms, but this is cer-
tainly false. Take the sentence “light (A) is electromagnetic waves (B)”. 
In this case it is surely not true that light is a synonym for electromagnetic 
radiation: we speak merely of two identical properties measured in two 
different ways. Take another example: when I say pain is the firing of 
neurons I certainly do not mean that pain and the firing of neurons are 
synonyms, but only that these are two identical properties described in 
two different ways. Since, in general, identifications do not require syn-
onymy of concepts there is no reason to demand that in morality. This does 
not mean that science can solve all moral dilemmas, it suggests merely 
that a better understanding of our sociality’s nature – social practices and 
problem-solving – can contribute a lot to a better understanding of our 
morality.
The eighth chapter, entitled “Religion and Morality”, discusses the so 
called supernatural approach to morality. Since we usually do not have 
problems with recognising morally right actions some people think that 
this is due to our God-given conscience. Conscience will always tell us 
what is right and what is wrong because it is the same in all of us and we 
all have it by birth. Granted, we have reliable feelings about what is mor-
ally acceptable, but it does not mean that there is some metaphysical entity 
with moral knowledge who takes care of that; to know what is right and 
what is wrong is entirely compatible with the neurobiology of learned so-
cial practices, i.e. with brain-gene-environment interactions. In addition, 
our inner voices do not always give us the same advice in similar situa-
tions, they differ among persons and even within ourselves. Conscience 
seems, therefore, only an auditory imagining of what is going to happen 
produced by our brains in the process of problem-solving rather than an 
ontological entity completely independent from the brain.
Another similar and probably the most dominant account says that 
morality originates in god, i.e. good is what God says is good, and bad is 
what God says is bad. But this is problematic, as Plato warned us in his 
dialogue The Euthyphro, because it leads us to the following dilemma: (a) 
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something is good because God says it is good, or (b) God says something 
is good because it is good. For the defenders of morality grounded in God 
none of the horns is acceptable: on the first horn, whatever God says can 
be moral (e.g. kill your son and feed your pigs with his body), and on the 
second horn, a source of morality is not God (he only transmits what is 
right, whereas this is right for some other reason than God). Socrates el-
egantly avoids answering his own question about the source of morality, 
but he seems to suggest, Churchland says, that what makes an action just 
or right is not hidden in an imaginary god but in the human nature and 
social community that we live in.
Does this mean that morality is an illusion, that is, if God is dead 
everything is allowed? Her answer is clearly no, morality is as real as it 
can be: it lives in our social behaviour which is rooted in the neurobiology 
of our brains, i.e. in activities of neural mechanisms or neural networks of 
different parts of the cortex. “It is a false dilemma because morality can be 
– and I argue, is – grounded in our biology, in our capacity for compassion 
and our ability to learn and figure things out” (200).
The book makes a valuable contribution to the naturalistic approach 
to the origins of morality, it cites the latest results of neurophysiological 
research and interprets them in combination with evolutionary biology, 
experimental psychology, and genetics. By explaining and understanding 
our social practices via scientific research Churchland tries to provide a 
neurobiological platform for morality and thus illuminates the usually ne-
glected account that moral properties are in some sense natural properties. 
Again, the naturalistic approach in its most general form says that moral 
properties are natural properties of the same sort and studied in the same 
way as properties investigated by the science. She is aware that this is not 
the whole story with regard to human moral values, as well as the pres-
ently limited powers of neurobiological explanations of social, and conse-
quently, moral behaviour – the complex neural mechanisms of our brains 
are still not clear enough.
Still, there is one thing worth mentioning: Churchland seems satis-
fied with the claim that moral properties are (via social properties) natural 
(neurobiological) properties, because she does not specify in what sense 
the former are the latter. The identification of moral and natural properties 
could be, namely, explained in, at least, two ways: (i) in terms of strict 
identity, where moral properties are nothing ‘over and above’ neurobio-
logical properties, which provides a reductive basis for morality, i.e. the 
links between morality and neurobiology are reductive and a moral vo-
cabulary only a shortcut in our communication, and (ii) in terms of loose 
identity, where moral properties are merely dependent on natural proper-
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ties in the sense of supervenience, which, however, allows morality to 
preserve its status of being a genuine entity.
However, Putnam’s rejection of Moore’s naturalistic fallacy which 
says that in the case of scientific discoveries we deal with reductive iden-
tifications of properties that are not synonymous, e.g. water is H
2
O, seems 
plausible only from the metaphysical point of view. If, for example, good is 
what is pleasant, i.e. ‘good’ is identical to ‘pleasant’ (and in the final reduc-
tive phase to the activity of neural mechanisms of our brains on the bio-
chemical level), how do we know that good is exactly what is pleasant? If 
knowing natural synonyms of ethical terms is not enough for moral knowl-
edge, as Putnam suggests, how do we acquire moral knowledge at all?
Moore’s answer to this epistemological gap which says that our ethi-
cal knowledge rests on intuitions is to the ethical naturalist, or more pro-
voking, ethical reductionist, of no help at all. We clearly do not know by 
intuition that water is H
2
O, we know that on the basis of experimental 
evidence. Therefore, when defending the epistemological component of 
her view the ethical reductionist has to appeal to the idea that knowledge 
of our moral facts is acquired in the same way as knowledge of our natu-
ral facts, i.e. by the help of empirical evidence. (Sturgeon 2006: 97) This 
looks like a descent and acceptable belief, also supported by Churchland.
Moreover, it seems that Moore assumed that every ethical naturalist 
has to be ethical reductionist, i.e. moral terms, such as ‘good’, have to be 
identical to clearly non-moral terms, e.g. ‘pleasure’, which could be given 
the current scientific research described in the book in the final step sub-
stituted for the bio-chemical activity of brains’ mechanisms. As to our still 
insufficient knowledge about neural processes in our brains and the com-
plexity of known synaptic networks representing merely a handful of the 
whole brain activity, and a common aversion to reductionism of any sort 
even if we had a full experimental data about the life of our brains at hand 
the wide acceptance of such a reductionism seems less likely if at all.
Finally, the book is excellent reading which explains complex neuro-
physiological mechanisms in a highly accessible way, making it interest-
ing to those who favour the biological approach in the study of morality as 
well as those who prefer rather more orthodox ways.
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